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Venice, Genoa, and John VIII 
Palaeologus’ Renovation of the 
Fortifications of Constantinople 
Marios Philippides 
Leslie S. B. MacCoull: In memoriam 
N INCIDENT involving Emperor John VIII Palaeologus 
and his Genoese neighbors at Pera, across Constan-
 tinople’s Golden Horn, is briefly described by Laonikos 
[= Nikolaos] Khalkokondyles. Khalkokondyles furnishes no 
specific date for this incident, but its position in his narrative 
suggests that it took place early in the 1430s.1 According to 
Khalkokondyles, a localized conflict arose between Constan-
tinople and the Genoese settlement because of John’s attempt 
to raise taxes on the Perenses (6.3):2 
Ἰωάννης δ’ οὖν ὁ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βασιλεὺς ἐπολέµει πρὸς τοὺς 
Ἰανυΐους, διενεχθεὶς ἀπὸ αἰτίας τοιᾶσδε, τῆς ἀπὸ κουµερκίων 
τοῦ Γαλάτου ἕνεκα. ἐνταῦθα οἱ Ἰανύϊοι ναῦς πληρώσαντες 
µεγίστας δὴ τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τριήρεις τρισκαίδεκα, καὶ 
ἐµβιβάσαντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὁπλίτας αὐτῶν ἀµφὶ τοὺς ὀκτακισχι-
λίους, ἐπέπλεον ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον, ἐξελεῖν βουλόµενοι.  
 
1 The incident occurred in 1434, as is correctly stated by the recent edi-
tor: A. Kaldellis, The Histories: Laonikos Chalkokondyles (Cambridge [Mass.]/ 
London 2014) II 488 n.8. 
2 Khalkokondyles is the only contemporary historian, and our only 
source, to speak of this incident as a local “war” between Pera and Con-
stantinople. Modern scholarship has not investigated this incident either, 
and the standard histories of the period neglect it altogether; the incident is 
presented in a rather obscure manner by Khalkokondyles. 
A
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John the king of Byzantium fought a war against the Genoese. 
The cause was his taxation of commerce profits from Galatas [= 
Pera]. At this point the Genoese equipped their largest ships and 
thirteen triremes and embarked about eighteen hundred of their 
hoplites [= armored men], and sailed against Byzantium in-
tending to seize it.  
This quarrel reached the stage of armed conflict because of 
John’s decision to increase his revenues by imposing new taxes 
on Pera. John was indeed in need of funds for his treasury, 
which must have been depleted after his recent successful cam-
paigns in the Morea against the local Italian lords. New funds 
were essential to finance his project of refortifying the walls of 
Constantinople, which had suffered serious damage during the 
siege by Murad II in the previous decade. A similar financial 
situation occurred later, early in the reign of John’s successor 
Constantine XI Palaeologus, who also tried to raise capital to 
support his defense against the Ottomans’ war preparations 
and mobilization to besiege Constantinople; in this later case 
Constantine was in violation of the existing treaty between the 
imperial court and the Serenissima, which John had concluded 
earlier with the Venetians, specifically by proposing to impose 
taxes on the Venetians over the sale of wine.3 While both 
Greek emperors, John and Constantine, may have violated 
articles of existing treaties, the fact was that they were in 
desperate need of funds and could not impose higher, or 
additional, taxes on their impoverished Greek subjects, as 
 
3 The treaty had been negotiated and signed by John VIII and the 
Venetians on 19 September 1442; the article disregarded by Constantine 
reads, in its Latin version: in quibus tabernis ordinatis sui Veneti possint vendere 
vinum cuiuscumque manierei ad minutum in quacumque quantitate, sine ulla gravitate (S. 
P. Lampros, “Συνθήκη µεταξὺ Ἰωάννου Ηʹ Παλαιολόγου καὶ τοῦ δουκὸς 
τῆς Βενετίας Φραγκίσκου Φόσκαρη,” Νέος Ἑλληνοµνήµων 12 [1915] 157). 
The questionable statement, sine ulla gravitate, which the Greek version of the 
treaty renders as χωρίς τινος βάρους, seems to constitute the nucleus of the 
complaint. For the Greek and Latin texts and an English translation of the 
treaty see M. Philippides, Constantine XI Dragaš Palaeologus: A Biography of the 
Last Greek Emperor (forthcoming), Appendix IV. 
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Constantinople’s wealth had gradually passed into the hands of 
the resident Italians.4 In addition, whatever wealth remained in 
Greek possession was in the hands of a very few enormously 
prosperous citizens of Constantinople, who, after the fall of 
1453, were accused of denying their fair share to the defense of 
their homeland and of investing their fortunes in various 
banking institutions in Italy. Later authors suggested that the 
consequence was the conquest of the city by the Ottoman 
Turks. The following comments constitute a typical sample of 
this attitude, in the anonymous sixteenth-century Barberini 
Chronicle:5 
 
4 That is the conclusion reached by D. M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A 
Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge 1988) 391. 
5 G. T. Zoras, Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν Τούρκων Σουλτάνων (κατὰ τὸν Βαρβ. 
Ἑλληνικὸν Κώδικα 111) (Athens 1956) 7.12: For a translation and 
commentary see M Philippides, Byzantium, Europe, and the Early Ottoman 
Sultans 1373–1513: An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Seventeenth Century (New 
Rochelle 1990). Identical sentiments are expressed in the narrative of 
Languschi-Dolfin (whose text, in a colorful mixture of the Venetian 
quattrocento dialect and Latin, may be the immediate source of the Barberini 
Chronicle; Languschi-Dolfin’s chronicle depends, to a large extent, on the 
Latin text of Bishop Leonardo’s eyewitness report on the siege and fall of 
Constantinople): G. M. Thomas, “Die Eroberung Constantinopels im Jahre 
1453 aus einer venetianischen Chronik,” SBMünch 2 (1868) 18, Et fu grande 
impieta de quelli baroni greci auari direptori de la patria. De li qual piu uolte el pouero 
Imperator cum lachrime domandaua, prestasseno denari per condur prouisionati. Et quelli 
iurauano esser poueri disfatti, che dapoi presi el Signor Turcho quelli trouo richissimi. Cf. 
Barberini Chronicle 7.33, which also depends on Languschi-Dolfin 31, et tutti li 
absconditi perueniano in man de Turci, o Greci miseri et miserabili che fingeui esser 
poueri. Ecco che sono uenuti in luce li uostri tesori, li quali teneui, et negaui uoler dar per 
subsidio de la citade. On the interdependence of these chronicles see M. 
Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonard and the 
Greek Accounts,” GRBS 22 (1980) 287–300, and “The Fall of 
Constantinople 1453: Bishop Leonardo and his Italian Followers,” Viator 29 
(1998) 189–227; M. Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, The Siege and Fall of 
Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies (Farnham 
2011) 139–193. On the wealthy class of the Greeks of Constantinople and 
the financial problems of the state see T. Kiousopoulou, Emperor or Manager: 
Power and Political Ideology in Byzantium before 1453 (Geneva 2011), esp. 112 ff.; 
 
380 VENICE, GENOA, AND JOHN VIII PALAEOLOGUS 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016) 377–397 
 
 
 
 
ὦ Ῥωµαῖοι φιλάργυροι, δηµηγέρτες, τραδιτόροι, ὁποὺ ἐτραδί-
ρετε τὴν πατρίδα σας, ὁποὺ ὁ βασιλέας σας ἤτονε πτωχὸς καὶ 
σᾶς ἐπαρακάλειε µὲ τά δάκρυα ’ς τά µάτια νὰ τοῦ δανείσετε 
φλωρία διὰ νὰ δώσῃ καὶ νὰ µαζώξῃ πολεµιστάδες ἀνθρώπους 
νὰ βοηθήσωσι καὶ νὰ πολεµήσουνε, καὶ ἐσεῖς άρνίεστε µεθ’ 
ὅρκους πὼς δὲν ἔχετε καὶ εἶστε πτωχοί! ἀµµὴ ὑστέρου, ὁποὺ σᾶς 
ἐπῆρε ὁ Τοῦρκος, εὑρέθητε πλούσοι καὶ σᾶς τὸ πῆρε ὁ Τοῦρκος 
καὶ ἔκοψε καὶ τὸ κεφάλι σας. 
O Romans! You were avaricious, rabble-rousers, and traitors. 
You handed over your homeland. Your emperor was poor; he 
begged you, with tears in his eyes, to lend him florins in order to 
hire and gather warriors to help in the war, but you refused, 
saying, with oaths, that you had no money and that you were 
poor. But later, after the Turk conquered you, you were found 
to be rich. The Turk deprived you of your wealth and cut your 
heads off. 
Constantine XI did not prevail in this quarrel with the 
Venetians; their differences, nevertheless, did not advance from 
diplomatic negotiations to armed conflict.6 It is also possible 
that, in 1452, Constantine had also planned to tax the Genoese 
of Pera, but advisors with long memory could have brought up 
John’s earlier fruitless attempt; in 1453 the Venetians were an 
___ 
for the wealth of one prominent individual and his family, whose fortunes 
had been invested in Italian banking institutions, see K. P. Matschke, “The 
Notaras Family and its Italian Connections,” DOP 49 (1995) 59–72; T. 
Ganchou, “Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les 
‘étrangères’ de l’élite byzantine au XVe siècle,” in M. Balard and A. 
Ducellier (eds.), Migrations et diasporas méditerrannéennes (Xe–XVIe siècles) (Paris 
2002) 149–229; E. Burke, “Surviving Exile: Byzantine Families and the 
Serenissima 1453–1600,” in I. Nilsson and P. Stephenson (eds.), Wanted: 
Byzantium. The Desire for a Lost Empire (Uppsala 2014) 109–131, esp. 115–118. 
6 N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l’Histoire des Croisades au XVe siècle VI 
(Bucharest 1916) 67, 68; for the documents of the period 2–17 August 1450 
see F. Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie III 
(Paris/The Hague 1961) 157–158, nos. 2830 and 2831. Constantine ex-
plained that his tax was pro utilitate urbis, “for the welfare of the city.” John 
VIII must have used a similar reason to raise the rate of the commercium on 
the Genoese of Pera. 
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easier target, prima facie, as their quarter was in close proximity, 
within Constantinople and not across the Golden Horn.  
After mentioning the attack on Constantinople by the Gen-
oese of Pera, Khalkokondyles interrupts his account of this 
“war” and describes an intervening armed conflict between the 
Genoese and the khan of Crimea, which prevented further 
hostile action against the Greek capital; the Greek historian 
then adds that, after their forces were released from duty in the 
Crimea, the Perenses turned their attention to Constantinople 
once more, held a public meeting to consider their military 
options, and launched an attack, with their naval forces, upon 
Constantinople’s sea walls along the Golden Horn (6.5):  
οὕτω δὴ ἀπαλλαχθέντες τοῦ πρὸς Σκύθας τοὺς ἐν τῷ Βοσπόρῳ 
νοµάδας, κατέπλεον ἐς Βυζάντιον, ἀφικόµενοι ἐς Γαλατίην 
πόλιν τὴν καταντικρὺ Βυζαντίου ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, καὶ κοινῇ βου-
λευσάµενοι, ὃν τρόπον τὴν πόλιν µαχούµενοι ἐξέλωσι, τάς τε 
ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν, καὶ ἐξοπλισάµενοι κατὰ τὸν Βυζαντίου λι-
µένα προσέφερον τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν τὴν 
πόλιν αἱρήσοντες. 
So the ones who had gone against the Scythians in the Bosporus 
sailed down to Byzantium and reached Galatas, the city across 
Byzantium in Europe; they held a general council in their effort 
to find a way to take the city; they manned their ships and, with 
full armament, they directed those ships to attack the walls of the 
harbor of Byzantium and capture the city with their fleet.  
They failed to muster sufficient forces to attack the land walls, 
but they probably had been encouraged by the precedent of 
the Fourth Crusade, when westerners had been able to pen-
etrate Constantinople’s sea walls, ignoring the land fortifica-
tions. The attack of the Perenses on Constantinople’s sea walls 
failed: 
οἱ µὲν οὖν Βυζάντιοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἀµυνούµενοι, καὶ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ τείχους ἐµάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἰανυΐους ἀξίως λόγου· καὶ ὡς 
προσέβαλλον τῷ τείχει ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἐπειρῶντο ἑλεῖν, οὐκ 
ἠδύναντο ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους, ἀµυνοµένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων 
κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν. ἐνταῦθα, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς προεχώρει, διέ-
στησάν τε καὶ ἀπέπλεον ἐπὶ Ἰταλίας.  
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The inhabitants of Byzantium prepared their defense and re-
sisted the Genoese from the walls bravely. The latter attacked 
the walls from their ships, but proved unable to mount the walls, 
as the Hellenes resisted mightily. Unable to achieve anything, 
they withdrew and sailed to away to Italy. 
The conflict went on for some time but there were no other 
direct attacks upon the land or the sea walls. Then the “siege” 
deteriorated to a stage of long-range bombardment between 
Pera and the city, but the Greeks then took the offensive: they 
blockaded Pera and the Genoese suburb, attacked its defenses, 
and prevented the settlement from receiving supplies. In ad-
dition, some ships of the Genoese were directly attacked7 and 
numerous Genoese sailors were captured to join other citizens 
of Pera who had been taken while defending the moat of Pera 
against the Greeks. In fact, their capture seems to have been 
the turning point in this “war.” Three hundred prisoners in 
chains were brought before John VIII in his residence and sub-
sequently diplomacy took over, a truce was declared, and a 
compromise was reached on the commerce taxes and on other 
minor matters (6.6):  
ἡ µὲν πόλις τῶν Ἰανυΐων ἡ Γαλατίη ἐπολέµει ἐπὶ συχνόν τινα 
χρόνον τῷ Βυζαντίῳ, καὶ τηλεβόλοις ἐξ ἀλλήλων οἵ τε Ἕλ-
ληνες καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Γαλάτου ἐνέβαλλον, ὁπότε καὶ ὁ Λεοντάρης 
Ἰωάννης τῷ τείχει τῆς Γαλατίης σφοδρῶς ἐπεισπεσὼν ἀπέ-
κλεισε ταύτην, στερηθεῖσαν παντὸς τροφίµου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νηῶν τῶν Ἰανυΐων ἐπιδραµὼν οὗτος 
κατέσχε, καὶ µεθ’ ἁλύσεων τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἰωάννῃ ὄντι ἐν τῷ οἰ-
κήµατι τοῦ Ξυλλᾶ προσεκόµισεν ὡσεὶ τριακοσίους, προσευρὼν 
τούτους ἐν τῷ χάρακι τοῦ Γαλάτου. 
Galatas, the city of the Genoese, fought a war against Byzan-
tium for some time; the Hellenes and the Genoese Perenses 
bombarded each other from their stations; at this point John 
Leontares launched a strong attack upon the wall of Pera and 
 
7 Khalkokondyles never mentions the activities of the Constantinopolitan 
Venetians at this time, a curious omission, given the traditional enmity be-
tween Venetians and Genoese. 
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enforced a blockade, which denied all supplies of food and other 
necessities. In raids he captured many of their men assigned to 
the ships. He brought them, about three hundred of them, in 
chains to King John who was residing in the Xyllalas palace; he 
had captured them in the vicinity of Pera’s ditch.  
In the compromise, Khalkokondyles specifies only that the 
Perenses agreed to the terms imposed by the emperor (without 
clarification on the commerce taxes, the origin of the dispute), 
adds that negotiations on taxes from Pera’s vineyards were also 
discussed, and states that reparations were paid for the dam-
ages that had been inflicted during the bombardment: 
µετὰ ταῦτα διαπρεσβευσάµενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους περί τε τῶν ἔξω 
ἀµπελίων τοῦ Γαλάτου καὶ περὶ τῶν κουµερκίων αὐτῶν, ὅπως 
συγκατατεθῇ ὁ βασιλεύς, συγκατένευσαν οἱ Ἰανύϊοι, ἀποχαρί-
σαντες καὶ µᾶλλον τῷ βασιλεῖ χρυσίνους χιλίους φθορᾶς ἕνεκα 
τοῦ ἐν τῇ Βασιλικῇ πύργου, εἰς ὃν οἱ Ἰανύϊοι τηλεβόλοις ἐχρή-
σαντο, καὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων τῶν ἐν τῇ Μέσῃ, ἐξ ὧν ἐχαλάσθη-
σαν, καὶ τὴν σηµαίαν αἴρειν τοῦ βασιλέως Ἑλλήνων. ταῦτα µὲν 
ἐς τοσοῦτον τοῖς Ἕλλησι προσενήνεκται ἐς τοὺς Ἰανυΐους. 
Afterwards, embassies were exchanged and negotiated the vine-
yards outside Galatas and their taxation; both the king [John 
VIII] and the Genoese reached an agreement and they yielded 
to the king one thousand gold coins for the damages they had 
caused on the tower by the Basilike [Gate], which had been 
struck by the bombs of the Genoese, and for the destruction of 
the workshops in the Mese; they also agreed to fly the flag of the 
king of the Hellenes. This was the agreement between the Hel-
lenes and the Genoese. 
Thus this incident was brought to an end. Such is the ac-
count in Khalkokondyles’ narrative, which, however, seems to 
simplify matters.8 The fact that he interrupts his narrative with 
 
8 The narrow view of Khalkokondyles and the pressing financial needs of 
John are followed in a short account of this incident by N. Necipoğlu, 
Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire 
(Cambridge 2009) 190, 191, without mention of the wider war between 
Venice and Genoa. 
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the offensive of the Genoese in the Crimea suggests that we are 
dealing with more intricate circumstances. It is also interesting 
that Khalkokondyles does not mention the Venetians of Con-
stantinople in the entire affair, who had their own quarters 
within Constantinople and would have been involved in the 
incident one way or another. The plain fact is that this incident 
was not a localized “war” between Pera and Constantinople 
but took place during a more serious war between Genoa and 
Venice. In this matter Khalkokondyles was not well informed 
and seems to have simplified a complicated situation. 
The actual nature of this conflict is treated, in its proper con-
text, in a contemporary rhetorical piece,9 an encomium-
panegyric in John’s honor, which has not been attributed to 
any specific author. This minor piece elucidates the circum-
stances involving Genoa and Venice, which included Constan-
tinople. According to this author, during the course of a war 
between the two traditional Italian enemies, John VIII played a 
significant role as a mediator. Thus he was not direct the cause 
of the war by raising taxes on Pera, in spite of what Khalko-
kondyles would have us believe; if he did so, it was an attempt 
to take advantage of the war between his two “allies,” Genoa 
and Venice. The author of the panegyric first produces a fair 
paragraph on the status of Pera and its origins (III 301): 
 
9 The quattrocento manuscript 34, fol. 105r–116v, in the patriarchal library 
of Cairo, was published in S. P. Lampros, Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννη-
σιακά III (Athens 1926) 292–308. In spite of the important historical in-
formation it contains, this Ἐγκώµιον εἰς τὸν Αὐτοκράτορα has never been 
translated into English and has been overlooked by scholars. Thus D. M. 
Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453 2 (Cambridge 1993), K. M. 
Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571) II (Philadelphia 1976), and the 
standard histories of late medieval Greece overlook the information em-
bedded in this piece. According to the editors, who oversaw the publication 
of Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά after the death of Lampros, the text 
is full of “παµπόλλων σολοικισµων καὶ βαρβαρισµῶν … ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ χρῆσις 
µετοχῆς ἀντὶ ὁριστικῆς” (III 292), which is perhaps an unfair and ex-
cessively pedantic charge; it is, after all, an informative, lucid piece that 
provides valuable historical information presented in competent Attic style. 
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οἱ Γαλάται, ἔθνος ὂν ἰταλικόν, τοῖς δόγµασι ἑπόµενον τῆς 
πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώµης, πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐνταῦθα παραγενόµενοι 
ἐξῃτήσαντο τόπον πλησίον τῆς πόλεως κατ’ ἀντιπέραν τοῦ πορ-
θµοῦ εἰς οἰκοδοµὴν ἄστεως παρὰ τῶν τηνικαῦτα βεβασιλευ-
κότων τῆς Ἑῴας µέρη, καὶ τυχόντως οὗπερ ᾐτοῦντο ᾠκοδόµησαν 
πόλιν … ἐγγέγραπτο δὲ ἐν ταῖς συµβάσεσιν ὑποτελεῖς εἶναι διὰ 
παντὸς καὶ σύµµαχοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἅπαντα 
… ἔκτοτε οὖν καὶ µέχρι τῆς δεῦρο οὐδαµῶς τοὺς ὅρους κε-
κινήκασι τοὺς παλαιούς, ἀλλ’ ἦσαν µεµνηκότες καὶ τὰ πιστὰ 
διατηροῦντες. 
The Galatans are an Italian nation, which follows the dogmas of 
the elder Rome. Many years ago they came here and they re-
quested, from the those who were the emperors of the eastern 
parts, a place near the city across the straits [= Golden Horn] to 
build a city; their request was granted … it was specified in a 
written agreement that they would be subjects and allies of the 
emperors through all eternity … Since then to the present day 
they have never violated the old terms; they were always mind-
ful of them and they kept the faith. 
As the anonymous author notes, the situation changed when 
the doge of Venice, Francesco Foscari, disapproved of a treaty 
that had been negotiated between Genoa and Milan; hostilities 
broke out,10 and Venice attacked Genoese possessions in the 
Levant, the primary target being Chios, held by the Genoese.11 
 
10 The duke of Milan attacked the Venetians, according to the author, 
and a war broke out (III 301): τοῖς Βενετίκοις µάλιστα ἐµπεπολεµωθεὶς [the 
duke of Milan] ἐγείρει πρὸς αὐτοὺς πόλεµον ἄσπονδον. The author was well 
informed as to the circumstances in Italy and certainly knew more details 
about the conflict between Venice and Genoa than Khalkokondyles. For 
the western sources on this war, its course in Italy, and the repercussions in 
the Levant (without any discussion of Constantinople or John VIII’s role) 
see P. Argenti, The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the 
Island 1346–1566 I (Cambridge 1958) 174–191. 
11 III 301–302: ἀλγήσαντες τοιγαροῦν τὸ τῶν Βενετίκων ἔθνος ὁµοίως τῷ 
δουκὶ καὶ κατ’ αὐτῶν [the Genoese] ἐφέροντο. εἶθ’ οὕτως ἐκπλεύσαντες 
ναυσὶ πεντεκαίδεκα ἐπὶ τὴν Χῖον. The antiquarian traveller Cyriacus of 
Ancona, who had acquired various Greek codices in the Levant (et ibi 
[Chios] Kyriacus per dies … lectitando Graecos quos … e Thessalonica libros miserat), 
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Twenty-one Venetian galleys, probably a separate contingent 
from the fleet dispatched to Chios, eagerly proceeded to Pera 
itself; the Genoese of Pera were not prepared to defend them-
selves, so they shut the gates of their suburb and attempted to 
protect their ships in the harbor. Then the anonymous author 
suggests that John VIII took it upon himself to play the role of 
a mediator. He gave the Venetian contingent a fine reception, 
honored its leaders with gifts, and sent a message to the 
Perenses pleading with them to refrain from overt hostilities in 
order to avoid an attack by the Venetian fleet. Nevertheless, 
the Genoese fired a cannon, whose projectile struck a Venetian 
galley and killed two sailors. The author states that only respect 
for the Greek emperor prevented the Venetians from attacking 
Pera at this point (III 302–303):  
ἐξαίφνης ὑφίστανται τοῦ πελάγους τῆς Προποντίδος τριήρεις 
τῶν Βενετίκων εἴκοσι καὶ µία … οἵ τε µὴν Γαλάται … οὐ 
παρεσκευάσαντο πρὸς παράταξιν … καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποσκευ-
ασάµενοι εἴσω τείχους γεγόνασιν, ὁµοῦ µὲν τὰ σώµατα ἀβλαβῆ 
τηρήσοντες, ὁµοῦ δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς διασώσουσι. 
ἀλλ’ ἦν µὲν ἅπαντα φροῦδα τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύµατα, εἰ τοῦ 
σοφωτάτου βασιλέως µὴ παρῆν ἐπιχείρησις … πρῶτον µὲν φι-
λοφρονεῖται τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ ἄσµενος δέχεται καὶ δώροις τιµᾷ, 
___ 
was detained in Chios, as the Genoese authorities were aware of the 
Venetian contingent making its way to the east to attack their island, and 
had prohibited the departure of all ships. After intense negotiations, Cyria-
cus and his ship were allowed to leave, but later he was stopped and was 
interrogated as a possible collaborator of the Genoese by the Venetian 
authorities at Corfu, which the Venetian armada, on its way to the Levant, 
had reached, before he was allowed to depart. The incident is recounted in 
Francesco Scalamonti’s Vita clarissimi et famosissimi viri Kyriaci Anconitani: C. 
Mitchell, E. W. Bodnar, and C. Foss (eds.), Cyriac of Ancona: Life and Early 
Travels (Cambridge [Mass.] 2015) 83–85, with the following conclusion: 
Kyriacus ipse … et apud Cassiopeum Corcirae insulae portum in Venetianam classem 
incidit. Sed Andreae Mucenigo praefecto oblatis Genuensium litteris, expedita navis per 
Illyricum tandem Anconitatum ad portum applicuit (also published TAPhS 86.4 
[Philadelphia 1966]). In addition, see the brief comments of M. Belozer-
skaya, To Wake the Dead: A Renaissance Merchant and the Birth of Archaeology (New 
York/London 2009) 125–126. 
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ἵν’ ἑλκύσῃ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τήν γε µὴν συµβουλὴν παραδέξονται 
καὶ µὴ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀφετηρίας ἀποστατοῦντες ἔσονται. κἀκεί-
νοις µὲν ὡσαύτως µηνύει καὶ συµβουλεύει µηδεµίαν καθ’ 
οἱονδήτινα τρόπον πρόφασιν δοῦναι … οὔπω τοίνυν τὸν λόγον 
δεξαµένοις, ταῖς ναυσὶν ἔτι περιπλεούσαις τὸν πορθµὸν ἐπαφί-
ησί τις ἀπὸ σκευῆς µηχανηµάτων λίθον, καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ οὐχ 
ἥµαρτεν, ἀλλ’ ἐνίοις τῶν πολεµίων βαλὼν ἐν τῇ τριήρει δι-
έθραυσεν ἄνδρας δύο, καί, εἰ µὴ αἰδὼς τοῦ κρατοῦντος τὴν 
ὁρµὴν τούτων συνέστειλεν, ὥρµησαν ἂν ὁµοθυµαδὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς 
ὥσπερ λέων εἰς θήραν. 
suddenly twenty-one Venetian triremes appeared from the Sea 
of Propontis ... the Galatans [= Genoese Perenses] … had not 
made preparations for a battle … and for that reason they 
moved within their walls, to avoid bodily injuries and protect 
their ships from fire. Yet all their precautions would have been 
in vain, if the wisest emperor had not intervened … First he en-
tertained the men [Venetians] and honored them with gifts, in 
order to befriend them, so they would accept his counsel and 
keep away from their original intention. He sent a message to 
the others [Perenses] and advised them to abstain from all 
provocation … Yet before they received his advice, with the 
ships still in the straits, someone fired a stone projectile from a 
cannon against the enemy, which did not miss its target but fell 
on a trireme and dismembered two men. It was only respect for 
the emperor that checked [the Venetians’] anger; otherwise they 
would have attacked with united spirit against them, like a lion 
upon prey. 
The author does not cite any further hostilities but concentrates 
on the advice that the emperor offered in order to bring the 
two sides together and end their differences (III 304):  
ταῦτα τοῦ βασιλέως … µάλα σοφῶς συµβουλεύσαντος, ἀποστῆ-
ναι µὲν τούτους τοῦ πολέµου κατέπεισε καὶ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν 
ἑλέσθαι, καὶ οὕτω τοῖς πολιορκηθεῖσιν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν παρέ-
σχον ἄδειαν ἀπηλλάγησαν. 
These words of the emperor … who offered wise advice per-
suaded them to end the war and [the Venetians] chose to de-
part. So they did and the besieged [Perenses] were free to enjoy 
their liberty. 
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Thus we seem to have two different accounts of the same in-
cident. The modern historian may be tempted to combine the 
two different narratives and suggest that the emperor and his 
diplomatic corps played a role in ending this conflict between 
the two Italian states in the vicinity of his capital. Nevertheless, 
one may observe that John probably used the hostilities be-
tween the two rival Italian states to his own advantage, as 
would be expected. For services rendered, he may have at-
tempted to raise capital by trying to extort funds from the 
Perenses, whose bombardment may have inadvertently dam-
aged some of his fortifications and some workshops. Taking 
advantage of the presence and the intentions of the Venetians, 
he may have felt strong enough to make demands, which he 
backed with some military force.12  
John was already occupied with a pressing problem that de-
manded a great deal of attention. The fortifications of Constan-
tinople erected at the end of antiquity and supplemented with 
extensions in subsequent periods had fallen into serious dis-
repair; the siege by Sultan Murad II in 1422 had demonstrated 
that they needed immediate attention, especially at the most 
vulnerable spot, the Mesoteikhion, or Middle Wall, where the 
stream Lykos penetrated the walls and entered the city, whose 
course had seriously eroded the ancient foundations.13 The 
 
12 In 1431 John had finally renewed his treaty, variously styled as τρέβα 
[= tregua], συνθῆκαι, συµφωνία, συµβόλαιον, στοίχηµα, apparently in the 
form of a chrysobull (χρυσῇ βούλῃ ἀπῃωρηµένῃ) with Venice; his mediating 
role in this incident would have raised his prestige among the warring alien 
residents in the city and across the Golden Horn in 1434. The text of the 
treaty has survived: Miklosich/Müller III 177–186 (the original document 
in Greek and Latin is in the State Archives of Venice, busta 35, no. 1047), 
with the following incipit in Greek and Latin: ἐπεὶ ὁ ἐπιφανής … κῦρ 
Φραντζέσκος Φούσκαρις, θεοῦ χάριτι δοὺξ Βενετίας / cum illustris et mag-
nificus dominus Franciscus Foscari, dei gratia dux Venetiarum. Cf. F. Dölger and P. 
Wirth, Regesten der Kaiserkunden des oströmischen Reiches V (Munich/Berlin 1965) 
115–116, no. 3433. See too the comments of Nicol, Byzantium and Venice 
373.  
13 For the moat and the neighboring fortifications see Philippides and 
Hanak, The Siege 309–311. For the topography of the area and its defenses 
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moat also needed attention.14  
So the emperor, hard pressed as he was for funds and for 
qualified builders and masons,15 had no choice but to proceed. 
He must have employed numerous untrained workers also, 
some of whom may have volunteered their services pro utilitate 
urbis, for the general welfare. Thus the author of the encomium 
to John testifies that, while laborers received wages, some 
clerics and monks offered their services gratis (III 298):  
οὐδ’ ἀµισθί, ἀλλὰ πάντας δουλεύειν µισθῷ µετά γε τῶν ὑποζυ-
γίων ἄνευ τῶν τὴν ἱερὰν τάξιν λαχόντων ἱερέων τε καὶ διακόνων· 
οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ µοναχῶν οὐκ ὀλίγη µερὶς συνεισῆλθεν ἀπό τε 
τῶν ἐντὸς σεµνείων καὶ προαστείων. ὅ γε µὴν ἅπας κλῆρος περὶ 
τὸν ποιµένα παρῆν, µετὰ τοῦ ποιµένος σχεδὸν ἅπαντες εἰς τοὖρ-
γον διαπονοῦντες πλὴν ἐνίων, καὶ τούτων τοῦ πλήθους ἐπιστα-
τούντων· οἱ δὲ ἦσαν οἱ πρόκριτοι, διατεταγµένοι πρὸς βασιλέως. 
___ 
cf., among others, the still valuable works of A. Van Millingen, Byzantine 
Constantinople: The Walls of the City and Adjoining Historical Sites (London 1899), 
and A. G. Paspates, Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται Τοπογραφικαὶ καὶ Ἱστορικαί 
(Constantinople 1877); the rather superficial account by G. Baker, The Wall 
of Constantinople (London 1910); B. C. P. Tsangadas, The Fortifications and 
Defense of Constantinople (New York 1980), who discusses the subject as far as 
the ninth century (and whose text is unfortunately marred by countless mis-
prints); and the modern standard account by R. Janin, Constantinople 
byzantine2 (Paris 1964.). Additional topographical material can be found in 
the various travelers’ reports collected in G. Majeska, Russian Travelers to 
Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (Washington 1984). Further 
details of topographical interest are also provided in accounts by western 
travelers: J. P. A. Van der Vin, Travellers to Greece and Constantinople: Ancient 
Monuments and Old Traditions in Medieval Travellers’ Tales I–II (Leiden 1980). 
On medieval Greek fortifications in general see C. Foss and D. Winfield, 
Byzantine Fortifications: An Introduction (Pretoria 1985), esp. 56–59. 
14 In all likelihood, in the quattrocento the moat did not extend as far north 
and as far uphill as the location of the Adrianople/Edirne Gate. 
15 K.-P. Matschke, “Builders and Buildings in Late Byzantine Constan-
tinople,” in N. Necipoğlu (ed.), Byzantine Constantinople: Monuments, Topography 
and Everyday Life (Leiden 2001) 315–328, emphasizes the acute shortage of 
appropriate building materials and the inadequate training of construction 
workers. 
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They did not do it for free, but all received wages for their work, 
together with the draft animals, except for sacred order of priests 
and deacons; indeed large groups of monks gathered from the 
sacred precincts and suburbs. The entire clergy stood around its 
pastor, and together with the pastor they labored, except for a 
handful, who were overseeing the large numbers, as they had 
been chosen and instructed by the emperor. 
Those appointed by the emperor must have been contractors, 
with contacts in the imperial court. One such family stands out, 
as John and then Constantine seem to have frequently availed 
themselves of the services of the Iagros/Iagaris family in this 
area. In time the contractors were accused of misappropriating 
the imperial funds assigned for the restoration of the defenses 
for their own private profit and shamelessly enriching them-
selves to the detriment of the walls. One such contractor was 
Manuel Iagaris.16 After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, he 
was singled out and explicitly blamed for the sad condition of 
the walls by one of the most authoritative eyewitnesses of the 
siege, Bishop Leonardo.17 One wonders whether Iagaris and 
 
16 His name is in fact recorded on an inscription on the wall, Paspates, 
Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται 45, no. 17: ΜΑΝΟΥΗΛΤΟΥΙΑΓΑΡΙ, Μανουὴλ τοῦ 
Ἰάγαρι. Clearly, John VIII made extensive use of the services of the 
Iagaris/Iagros family, whose members often undertook diplomatic missions 
as well as contracts in the renovation of the fortifications. For some sur-
viving inscriptions associated with John’s program see the Appendix. 
17 Bishop Leonardo named another contractor associated with Iagaris, 
the anti-unionist hieromonk Neophytos of Rhodes. Leonardo includes a 
sardonic observation in his text, that their illicit profits eventually fell into 
the hands of the Turks (PG 159.936): At quid dicam? arguamne principem … an 
potius eos qui ex officio muros reficere debuissent? O quorum animae forte damnantur, 
Manuelis Giagari dudum inopis, et Neophyti hieromonaci Rhodii, si audeo dicere, prae-
donum, non conservatorum reipublicae, quibus veluti reipublicae tutoribus, aut ex aviis 
intestatisque bona relicta, muris ascribi debebant, privatis potius commodis impedebant. 
Primus viginti prope millium florenorum servus proditionis monachus, quos posthac re-
conditos urna septuaginta millium gazam reliquunt Teucris. Idcirco urbs praedonum in-
curia in tanta tempestate periit. Identical statements are repeated in the chronicle 
by Languschi-Dolfin, which provides, for the most part, a translation or 
paraphrase of Leonardo’s Latin: Languschi-Dolfin 1–38, esp. 22: Ma per 
questo non e, da improperar lo Imperator, perche quello sempre haue bona fede in la 
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his fellow contractors were to blame for the shoddy repairs or 
for employing unskilled laborers to carry out the work. 
Exactly when the project began to be implemented and how 
long it went on remain problematic questions, as our sources 
provide only vague chronologies. Thus the anonymous pan-
egyric states that the program was initiated after “John’s 
victories in the Morea and his return to the capital.”18 The 
program was not finished in the reign of John, and work 
continued until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. While our 
sources do not provide specific dates, the program initiated by 
John was accented by several embedded inscriptions which 
mention his renovation and, most of the time, also provide 
dates for the completion of respective sections. Thus the epi-
graphical evidence from the fortifications themselves supplies a 
few hints about the work that was carried out. Some of those 
inscriptions are still in situ on the walls; others have disap-
peared, and we would not be wrong to assume that numerous 
inscriptions have vanished over the centuries.  
In the nineteenth century a scholar noted, studied, and 
recorded those inscriptions that were still in evidence.19 Thus 
___ 
romana chiesa, ma era uinto da pusillanimita, ma alcuni Greci, Manuel Jagari, et 
Neophyto Jeronaco Rodiani, ladri corsari non curauano conseruar el publico, hauendo 
gran richeze de auo quelle tegniua a suo priuati commodi. El primo hauea 70 millia 
ascosti in Zara lassati a Gazan Turcho. Et per poca cura de questi tali in tanti affani 
lassono perir la citade. 
18 III 296: ἐπαναζεύξαντος τοίνυν τοῦ θειοτάτου βασιλέως µετά γε τῆς 
νίκης καὶ τῶν τροπαίων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Πέλοπος.  
19 Paspates (Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται 35–61) personally examined the circuit 
of the walls and meticulously recorded forty-one inscriptions that he could 
identify by visual inspection. Paspates was born in Chios in 1814, survived 
the massacre committed there by Ottoman troops during the Greek war of 
independence in 1822, and fled to Malta. Through the efforts of several 
American philhellenes he was sent to Boston, was adopted by the family of 
Marshall P. Wilder at the harbor, and was brought up and educated in the 
U.S. He graduated from Boston’s Latin School and from Amherst College 
in 1831, continued his studies in Italy, England, and France, and eventually 
established himself in Constantinople as a successful physician. He was one 
of the first scholars to examine Constantinople’s medieval remains from the 
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according to his collection, eight inscriptions were observed 
and recorded that are definitely associated with John’s program 
of renovations; they bear the following dates (and cf. the Ap-
pendix): 1433, May 1433, June 1433, April 1434, October 
1438, January 1439, August 1441, and 1444. Most include the 
month and year of the renovation, two record the year only, 
and one bears the emperor’s name without supplying a date. 
From that slender record, it looks as if the renovation program 
started as early as 1433 and continued throughout the decade, 
without reaching completion.  
Other inscriptions testify that the program was partly aided 
by funds provided by Despot George Branković of Serbia as 
well, as late as 1448.20 Thus one inscription, on the sea walls on 
a tower between “Koum Kapoussi and Yeni Kapoussi,” 
displayed the following text, which bears a date: “This tower 
and curtain wall were restored by George, Despot of Serbia, in 
the year 6956 [anno mundi = 1448].”21 According to this inscrip-
tion, the Serbian despot was responsible for the renovations of 
a tower by the Gate of Adrianople/Edirne.22  
___ 
archaeological point of view and published numerous studies on medieval 
Constantinople. 
20 Exactly when George supplied funds is not known; it may have been as 
late as the reign of John’s successor. His contribution may be recorded in an 
inscription by the Fourth Military Gate; cf. discussion (with scholarly lit-
erature) in Philippides and Hanak, The Siege 333–335. On George of Serbia 
and John VIII see Nicol, The Last Centuries 383–385, 394–395, and 402 for 
the despot’s contribution to the repairs. See also K.-P. Matschke, “Die Stadt 
Konstantinopel und die Dynastie der Palaiologen,” in Das spätbyzantinische 
Konstantinopel. Alte und Neue Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte zwischen 1261 und 1453 
(Hamburg 2008) 65–66. 
21 Van Millingen, Byzantine Constantinople 193: †ΑΝΕΚΕΝΙϹ/ΘΗΝΟΥΤΟϹ/ 
ΟΠΥΡΓΟϹΚΑΙ/ΚΟΡΤΙΝΑΥ/ΠΟΓΕΩΡΓΙ/ΟΥΔΕϹΠΟΤΟΥ/ϹΕΡΒΙΑΣΕΝΕΤΕΙϹϠΕϹ,
ἀνεκενίσθην οὗτος ὁ πύργος καὶ κορτίνα ὑπὸ Γεωργίου δεσπότου Σερβίας 
ἐν ἔτει ,ςϡεςʹ. 
22 J. Kalić, “ Ἡ Σερβία καὶ ἡ Πτώση τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως,” in E. 
Khrysos (ed.), Ἡ Ἅλωση τῆς Πόλης (Athens 1994) 193–208, esp. 198. In-
tense inspection of the existing remains in this area by W. K. Hanak and M. 
Philippides in the summers of 2000, 2001, and 2003 did not reveal the 
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Moreover, even in the reign of John there were private 
volunteers in Constantinople who paid for some renovations. It 
is also possible that Constantine, while he was despot of Morea, 
also contributed funds, if an inscription embedded at the 
Rhegion Gate recording a “Despot Constantine” in fact refers 
to him.23 There is one inscription, which presents the longest 
surviving text, stating that the restoration at this spot was paid 
for by the donation of Manuel Bryennios; it mentions John and 
his queen, Maria, and is dated early on in the project, 1433.24 
Clearly private funds donated by individuals were also sought 
and used in the renovation program. At least two inscriptions 
indicate that it continued well into the reign of Constantine 
XI.25 One section of the fortifications was being repaired just 
___ 
presence of this inscription in the location cited by Van Millingen; perhaps 
it has been transferred elsewhere. This sector of the fortifications has under-
gone a great deal of renovation lately and large sections of the old walls are 
missing. The inscription is no longer embedded in the walls; and Kalić cites 
no literature or scholarship on inscription or its present location. Further-
more, Paspates, Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται, does not list it in his catalogue. Thus 
its existence and fate present a mystery. 
23 Paspates, Βυζαντιναὶ Μελέται 46, no. 18: ΝΙΚΑΗΤΥΧΗ/ΚΩΝϹΤΑΝ-
ΤΙΝΟΥΤΟΥΘΕΟ/ΦΥΛΑΚΤΟΥΗΜΩΝΔΕϹΠΟΤΟΥ, νικᾷ ἡ Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ 
θεοφυλάκτου ἡµών δεσπότου. Paspates did not assign it to Constantine XI, 
the brother of John VIII, and only expressed his inability to identify the 
individual behind this name: “Ἀδύνατον εἶναι νὰ εἰκάσωµεν, τίνα Κων-
σταντῖνον µνηµονεύει ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ αὕτη.” For a photograph see Philippides 
and Hanak, The Siege, pl. 19. 
24 Paspates 54–55, no. 30: ἀνεκαινίσθη ἡ θεόσωστος πύλη αὕτη τῆς 
Ζωοοδόχου Πηγῆς διὰ συνδροµῆς καὶ ἐξόδου Μανουὴλ Βρυεννίου τοῦ 
Λέοντος ἐπὶ βασιλείας τῶν εὐσεβῶν βασιλέων Ἰωάννου καὶ Μαρίας τῶν 
Παλαιολόγων ἐν µηνὶ Μαΐῳ ,ςϡµαʹ . 
25 Paspates 56–57, no. 34: Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου αὐτοκράτορος. It 
does not bear a date. Paspates suggests that this inscription could not refer 
to Constantine XI, the brother of John VIII, who, as Paspates was well 
aware (57: δὲν ἐστέφθη ποτὲ αὐτοκράτωρ), was never formally crowned. 
The fact is that, throughout his short reign, Constantine XI was addressed 
as emperor of Constantinople by numerous contemporaries, including Lu-
dovico Fregoso of Genoa (cf. e.g. his letter to Constantine, Παλαιολόγεια 
καὶ Πελοποννησιακά IV [Athens 1930] 64, dated 23 May 1452), and the 
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before the siege and had been financed by funds donated by 
Cardinal Isidore.26 
While the wide distribution of the inscriptions along the walls 
indicates that restorations went on throughout the circuit of 
fortifications, our anonymous author concentrates on certain 
areas that needed special attention. Thus he states first the 
emperor’s personal concern over the state of the defenses and 
his conclusion that in his own time the walls could not be relied 
upon to provide adequate protection against future attacks; he 
then goes on to specify a few areas that received attention (III 
296–299): a tower by the Imperial Gate, which had never been 
completed, was renovated;27 two towers in the Blanka district 
___ 
formality of a coronation was generally overlooked. Similarly Charles VII of 
France, in an undated letter to Constantine, addresses him as: Serenissimo ac 
potentissimo Principi Constantino Dei Gratia Despoti Regi Romeorum o Palaeologos, 
Fratri ac consanguineo nostro carissimo (Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά IV 
65). Barbaro, in his valuable diary of the siege of 1453, always refers to 
Constantine as the unquestioned emperor: e.g. E. Cornet, Giornale dell’Assedio 
di Constantinopoli 1453 di Nicolò Barbaro P. V. (Vienna 1856) 29, una fusta de’l 
imperador; 34, el serenissimo imperador Constantin; 56, el serenissimo imperador, 
among many other citations. Constantine himself employed the standard 
imperial formula (echoed in Charles VII’s address in Latin) of the Palae-
ologan emperors in signing official documents: Κωνσταντῖνος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ 
θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωµαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος; see e.g. his 
signature in the chrysobull to the Ragusans (1451), quoted in full in 
Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά IV 23–27. All modern historians, it 
should be noted, accept Constantine XI as the last emperor of Con-
stantinople. For the second inscription that may refer to the activities of 
Constantine, cf. n.21 above. 
26 Detailed discussion in W. K. Hanak and M. Philippides, Cardinal Isidore:   
A Historical and Literary Study of His Life and Times (forthcoming), ch. 4. 
27 πύργος ἦν ἀτελὴς πρὸς τῇ λεγοµένῃ Βασιλικῇ πύλῃ, ἐκ προγόνων µὲν 
ἀρχόµενος ἀνοικοδοµεῖσθαι … οὐκ ἠδυνήθη συναπαρτίσαι εἴτε σπάνει 
χρηµάτων, εἴτε ὀλιγωρίᾳ … διήρκεσεν ἀτελὲς τὸ ἔργον ἄχρι καὶ τῆς βασι-
λείας τοῦ ἡµετέρου, “there was an unfinished tower in the vicinity of the 
Basilike Gate, whose erection had been begun by our ancestors … but lack 
of funds or lack of time had not allowed its completion … the project 
remained unfinished until the reign of our king.” 
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were erected from scratch;28 moreover, drainage work was un-
dertaken at the fortifications by the Kontoskalion harbor.29 He 
devotes a special section to the repairs that were carried out at 
the different sections of the moat. He claims that it was a labor 
worthy of the ancient king of Persia, Xerxes, who had cut a 
canal on the Athos peninsula in Khalkidike in 480 B.C.30 In 
particular, he makes special mention of the ditches in the 
vicinity of the palace that were in need of restoration, as they 
had suffered from adverse weather over the centuries and had 
been filled in by natural erosion.31 
 
28 ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ ἑτέρους δύο ἐν χώρῳ λεγοµένῳ τοῦ Βλάγκα ἐκ βάθρων 
ἀνήγειρε, µεγέθει µεγίστους καὶ κάλλει διαπρεπεῖς καὶ µηδαµῶς ὄντας δευ-
τέρους τῶν µάλιστα διαφερόντων, “indeed he erected, from their foun-
dations, another two [towers], which were incomparable in size and dis-
tinguished in their beauty, and matching our best existing towers.” 
29 ἐν τόπῳ λεγοµένῳ κοινῇ διαλέκτῳ Κοντοσκαλίῳ … πολλὴν ὁ χῶρος 
τὴν ὕλην ἐντὸς εἰσεδέξατο … ἔδοξε τῷ κρατοῦντι ἐκφορηθῆναι ταύτην ἐκ 
µέσου, “the place commonly called [the harbor of] Kontoskalion … had 
been silted up … so the emperor thought it would be best to excavate it.” 
30 καὶ ἦν ἔργον δεόµενον χειρὸς Ξέρξου τοῦ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέως, ὅν 
φασι κατὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρώην ἐκστρατεύσαντα κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν 
… ἐν τῷ Ἄθῳ … διώρυχα κελεῦσαι τοῦτον ποιῆσαι ὡς ἐν πελάγει τὴν 
ἤπειρον λέγεται διελθεῖν, “the project needed the hand of Xerxes, the king 
of the Persians, who is said to have made a canal across [the peninsula of] 
Athos, during his early invasion of Hellas, so that he could bypass the land 
through the sea.” It is interesting to note that the memory of Xerxes was 
revived at this time and the ancient king is mentioned often enough in 
literature, especially in the literature of the siege of 1453; on this see M. 
Philippides, “The Fall of Constantinople 1453: Classical Comparisons and 
the Circle of Cardinal Isidore,” Viator 38 (2007) 349–383; W. K. Hanak and 
M. Philippides, Cardinal Isidore, ch. 5. 
31 ἐνταῦθα [πρὸς τὸ κλίτος τῶν βασιλείων] γὰρ αἱ διώρυχες περὶ τὸ 
τεῖχος καὶ τάφροι πάλαι µὲν εἰς βάθος ὠρύγησαν παρὰ τῶν τηνικαῦτα 
κρατούντων, ἑκατέρων τε τῶν µερῶν, φηµὶ δὴ τῆς τάφρου, ἐκ θεµελίων 
ἀνεγειρόµενα τείχη βραχύ τι ἀνεστηκότα τῆς ἐπιφανείας τῆς γῆς· χρόνου δὲ 
προϊόντος ἐν ὥραις χειµεριναῖς τῇ τῶν ὑδάτων ἐπιρροῇ κατὰ µικρὸν τὴν 
ὕλην ἐπισπωµένων ἐπληρώθησαν ταύτης ἄχρι τῶν ἄνω, “At this point [near 
slope of the palace] the ditches and the moat by the walls had been dug to a 
great depth, on both sides (of the moat, I mean), at a short distance from the 
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Thus by reading Khalkokondyles’ limited narrative together 
with the information supplied by the anonymous panegyric 
and by viewing these documents as serious contributions to the 
Levantine situation ca. 1434–1435, it can be demonstrated that 
Constantinople played a role in the war between Venice and 
Genoa, as we can discern that there were repercussions in the 
Levant and that the imperial court was involved in the conflict. 
The conclusions of the Italian operations in the Levant, 
especially if John VIII received reparations or monetary con-
tributions in some form from the Genoese Perenses, may have 
assisted in his program of refortifying Constantinople’s de-
fenses; at the very least the damage that likely occurred during 
the operations against Constantinople may have acted as a 
catalyst for John and prompted him to intensify his renovation 
policy. Thus a Genoese infusion of cash may have assisted in 
the early stages of renovating the fortifications.  
APPENDIX: Inscriptions of John VIII  
on the Eastern (Sea) and Western (Land) Walls 
The following inscriptions on the walls of Constantinople that bear 
the name of John VIII were examined and recorded in the nine-
teenth century. 
1. Paspates 40, no. 7 
ΙΩΑΝΝΗϹΕΝΧΩΤΩ Ἰωάννης ἐν Χ<ριστ>ῷ τῷ 
ΘΩΠΙΣΤΟϹΒΑϹΙΛΕΥϹ Θ<ε>ῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς 
ΚΑΙΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡΡΩΜΑΙΩΝ καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωµαίων 
ΟΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟϹΚΔΑΤΑΜΗΝΑ ὁ Παλαιολόγος κατ966ὰ µῆνα 
ΑΥΓΟΥϹΤΟΝ ΤΗ Δ⊃Ρ Αὔγουστον τῇ Δ (δευτέρᾳ?) 
ΤΟΥςϡΜΘΕΤΟΥϹ τοῦ ,ςϡµθʹ  ἔτους. 
John in Christ the God faithful king and emperor of the Romans 
Palaeologus in the month of August a Monday [?] of the year 
6949 [anno mundi = 1441]. 
___ 
foundations of the walls rising from the ground, by those who had been in 
power long ago; with the passage of time and the winter floods, they had 
been filled all the way to the top.” 
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2. Paspates 44, no. 16 
†ΑΝΕΚΑΙΝΙϹΕΤΟΚΑϹΤΡΟΝΟΛΟΝΙΩΧΩΑΥ  
ΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡΟΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟϹΕΤΕΙςϡΜΘ† 
†ἀνεκαίνισε τὸ κάστρον ὅλον Ἰω<άννης ἐν> Χ<ριστ>ῷ  
Αὐτοκράτωρ ὁ Παλαιολόγος ἔτει ,ςϡµθʹ .†   
John Palaeologus emperor in Christ renovated the entire circuit 
of the fortifications in the year 6941 [= 1433]. 
3. Paspates 52, no. 24 
ΙΩΕΝΧΩ Ἰω<άννου> ἐν Χ<ριστ>ῷ  
ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑ Αὐτοκρά-  
ΤΟΡΟϹΤΟΥΠΑΛΑΙ τορος τοῦ Παλαι- 
ΟΛΟΓΟΥΚΑΤΑΜΗΝΑΟΚΤ ολόγου κατὰ µῆνα Ὀκτ<ώβριον> 
ΤΟΥςϡΜςΕΤΟΥϹ τοῦ ,ςϡµςʹ  ἔτους. 
[Renovation?] of John Palaeologus, emperor in Christ, in the 
month of October of the year 6946 [= 1438]. 
4. Paspates 52, no. 25 
ΙΩΟΥΕΝΧΩΑΥΤΟ Ἰω<άννου> ἐν Χ<ριστ>ῷ Αὐτο- 
ΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣΤΟΥΠΑ κράτορος τοῦ Πα- 
ΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟΥ λαιολόγου 
ΚΑΤΑΜΗΝΑΙΑΝΟΥ κατὰ µῆνα Ἰανου- 
ΑΡΙΟΝΤΟΥς άριον τοῦ ,ς 
ϡΜΖΕΤΟΥΣ ϡµζʹ  ἔτους. 
[Renovation?] of John Palaeologus, emperor in Christ, in the 
month of January of the year 6947 [= 1439].32 
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